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The purpose of this thesis is to describe the develop-
ment and integration of the Alcohol Rehabilitation Program
from 1965 to 1980. It shows that throughout this period
Naval organizational needs and Alcohol Program needs were
being met. It also illustrated that the Navy and Alcohol
Program personnel acted in accordance with their own goals
and vested interests, both to their mutual benefits. These
two different goals were brought together at approximately
1970. These forces responsible were the Vietnam War, selec-
tion of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations
and passage of Public Laws 91-616 and 92-129 on alcohol
abuse. The leaders of the Alcohol Program utilized these
forces well, and through proper management of their program,
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The purpose of this thesis is to describe the develop-
ment and integration of the Alcohol Rehabilitation Program
from 1965 to 1980. It shows that throughout this period,
Naval organizational needs and Alcohol Program needs were
being met. Both the Navy and Alcohol Program personnel
acted in accordance with their own goals and vested interests
Specifically, from the Navy's side, the problems facing
the organization were the inevitable post war reduction in
manpower when peace came to Vietnam and the legislation
about to be enacted requiring the end of conscription. This
would mean the Navy would have to draw it's future manpower
from increased re-enlistment rates of qualified active duty
personnel, and/or from the society at large. In either case
it meant increased social action programs by the Navy to
align itself with society's current values.
From the Alcohol Rehabilitation Program supporters view-
point, most of the leaders and workers in the office were
recovered alcoholics who had conquered their disease through
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) . The perceived responsibility for
an attendee of AA was to help other alcoholics help them-
selves. These recovered alcoholics were modern day crusaders
out to "save the lives" of those who were currently alcohol

abusers or alcoholics. These supporters understood the
disease and felt with the proper resources they could estab-
lish a network of programs in the Navy to reach this goal.
The forces that brought these two goals together occurred
at approximately 197 0. These forces were the Vietnam War,
selection of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt as Chief of Naval opera-
tions and passage of Public Laws 91-616 and 92-129 on Alcohol
Abuse. The leaders of the Alcohol Program utilized these
forces well, and through proper management of their Program,
it became an established support unit of the Navy.
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapters
II through VI illustrate major stages of development and
integration of the Alcohol Program. The final chapter ad-
dresses conclusions from the data.
B . METHODOLOGY
Due to the broad scope of this study and the dearth of
available literature on the historical development of alcohol
rehabilitation in the Navy, the major historical perspectives
were gained through interviews of both incumbent and non-
incumbent personnel in the Navy Alcohol Program. Virtually
all of the early major leaders in the Program were interviewed
in addition to many officials currently in place. A total of
19 interviews were done, 11 by phone and 8 in person. Those
done in person included 1 at Long Beach Naval Hospital, 5

at ARC San Diego and 2 in Washington D.C. All interviews
were done within a three month period from January to March
1981. Each lasted from 30 minutes to 3 hours.
The second methodology utilized was literary data.
Additional data were gathered from instructions, notices,
newsletters, messages, original letters/point papers, tran-
scripts, and magazines. Instructions and notices included
all available issued on Drug and Alcohol Programs by SECNAV,
OPNAV, BUPERS, and most recently CNMPC. Newsletters from
Alcohol Prevention Program and the National Council on Alco-
holism were reviewed. Messages including Z-grams (Admiral
Zumwalt CNO messages) and applicable OPNAV and BUPERS mes-
sages were examined. In addition, original letters/point
papers were acquired through historical files in the Drug and
Alcohol Office in Washington D.C. and material was sent to
me by many of the early members of the program. It included
commendations to early Alcohol Program leaders' notes address-
ing Program name changes, in-house memorandums on Program
status, and unpublished point papers on justification of
ARC's, NASAP's and CAAC ' s addressed to the Chief of Naval
Personnel
.
A number of Senate Hearings were held concerning alcohol
abuse. Two in particular; the Subcommittee on Alcoholism
and Narcotics, ninety first Congress held in November and
December of 1970, and the discussion by the ninety second
Congress on Title V of Public Law 92-129, were considered

significant to the historical development of the Navy's
Alcohol Program. Finally, a number of magazine articles
were reviewed. Of particular interest were the Time Maga-
zine "Essays." These gave great insight to the public
conscience during the war in Vietnam, when the Alcohol
Program was just starting.
Secondary data, the last methodology, were acquired
through external and internal research projects. Approxi-
mately 20 were surveyed including Naval Health Research
Reports 78-48, 79-58, and 80-10; Rand R-2308-AF, "Alcohol
Problems, Patterns and Prevalence in the U.S. Air Force;"
Presearch Inc. Report no. 394, "Summary of Cost Benefit
Study Results for Navy Alcoholism Rehabilitation Programs,"
and "1978 Evaluation of the NASAP and Alcoholism Counselor
Training Programs," by NARC, San Diego.
C. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are recognized by the Chief
of Naval Operations in various instructions and are an accu-
mulation of terms used throughout this thesis:
Alcohol-a chemical compound known as CH-^CH-OH, commonly
called ethanol. It is normally found in three major classes
of beverages; beer, wine and distilled spirits.
Alcoholism-a nonratable disease characterized by psycholog-
ical and/or physical dependency on alcohol.
Alcoholic (Alcohol Dependent) -a general reference to an in-
dividual who suffers from alcoholism.
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Alcohol Abuse-any irresponsible use of an alcoholic beverage
which leads to misconduct, unacceptable behavior, or impair-
ment of an individual's performance of duty, physical or
mental health, financial responsibility, or personal relation-
ships. It may also lead to alcoholism.
Alcoholics Anonymous-an organization of recovering alcoholics
dedicated to the mutual self support of those afflicted with
the disease of alcoholism, through the model of 24 principles,
including twelve steps to sobriety (Appendix A)
.
Alcohol Addiction-a physiological condition in which there
usually is a marked change in tolerance to alcohol, and con-
sumption of alcohol is necessary for the prevention of with-
drawal symptoms
.
Alcohol Rehabilitation Center (ARC) -provides inpatient
treatment for alcohol dependent personnel. Each has approxi-
mately 80 beds for a 6 week program of rehabilitation.
Referral is through the Armed Services Medical Regulating
Office (ASMRO) . All three are under the functional control
of Chief of Naval Personnel.
Alcohol Rehabilitation Drydock (ARD) -rehabilitation units
sponsored by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, distributed to
local commands and functionally under the control of major
commands such as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. It was
an abbreviated treatment for alcohol abusers, allowing the
local commands to treat their own less serious cases.
11

Alcohol Rehabilitation Service (ARS) -provides inpatient
treatment for alcohol dependent personnel. Each of the 24
ARS ' s are located in Navy hospitals and have approximately
15-25 beds each. Referral is primarily through the Armed
Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO) . All 24 are
under the functional control of the Chief of Medicine and
Surgery.
Counseling and Assistance Center (CAAC) -formally called CARE
centers; are currently established in 67 locations. Their
major function is to screen and evaluate alcohol and drug
abusers, to make disposition recommendations to commanding
officers of their assigned locations, and to provide coun-
seling and/or referral for additional treatment as necessary.
Intoxication- a state of impaired mental and/or physical
functioning, resulting from the presence of alcohol in a
person's body. This condition does not necessarily indicate
alcoholism as defined here, nor does the absence of observable
intoxication necessarily exclude the possibility of alcoholism.
Navy Alcohol Safety Action Program (NASAP) -a program directed
toward the early identification and prevention of alcohol
abuse among Naval personnel. It consists of an after working
hours course of 36 hours instruction in alcohol abuse and
alcoholism for persons involved in alcohol-related military
or civilian offenses.
Problem Drinker (Habitual Alcohol Abuser) -a person who may or
may not be an alcoholic, but whose use of alcohol conforms to
the definition of alcohol abuse.
12

Recovered Alcoholic-a person whose alcoholism has been
arrested. Normally, this is accomplished through abstinence
and is maintained through a continuing personal program of




II. THE BEGINNING (4000 B.C. -1970)
"Bureaucracy defends the status quo long
past the time when quo has lost it's status"
Laurence J. Peter
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the enlightened men of the silver screen stated
that it was a woman that drove him to drink and he never
stopped to thank her. The man was W. C. Fields and the drink,
of course, was alcohol. It has been with us for at least as
long as recorded history and even today is used in many
ceremonies in which man participates. From house warmings
to office parties, from sports events to holy holidays, al-
cohol is often the focus of celebration. While its use is
widely accepted throughout our culture, its abuse is not.
Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has been viewed as being a
group of hard living, hard working, hard drinking people.
For close to two hundred years alcohol had been part of the
Navy's methodology for comradery and perceived as a necessary
compensation for the rigors in development of an effective
fighting force. Observe a few of the uses:
Formal Dining-ins
Change of Command Ceremonies








For years the cost in both personnel and dollars was
acceptable for the Navy and many alcohol abusers could handle
a schedule of working and drinking with little adverse effect.
Others, however, were not so lucky.
A recent study estimated that one in ten suffers from
chronic alcohol abuse and additional studies indicate the
Navy at large is no different than the civilian population.
It is a multi-billion dollar problem touching both civilian
and military personnel. The total loss the Navy is estimated
between 360-680 million dollars annually [1] . Countless
man-hours are lost because of alcohol related illnesses or
hospitalizations and it is now recognized as the number
three health problem in the United States, closely following
heart disease and cancer [2].
Until recently, little was known about the problem. Like
much of the civilian industry, alcoholic sailors were typically
hidden and tolerated in the system without resolution of their
difficulties with alcohol until they proved to be ineffective.
It is only now, after at least 4000 years of use, that we are




The development of programs to assist the abuser really
began with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) in 1935. It eventually
demonstrated that a large number of alcoholics could be
saved; e.g., continue productivity in society, using a model
developed by two recovering alcoholics.
The twelve steps to sobriety (Appendix A) , developed the
basic principles and heart of the AA recovery process. These
principles are still in use today.
By 1944, Mrs. Marty Mann had founded the National Council
on Alcoholism, a national voluntary health agency. The
agency worked from 1944-1959 attempting to develop alcoholism
programs for employees of companies and government depart-
ments. By 1959, there were only 50 companies, both large and
small, that had formal programs on alcohol abuse in effect.
Recognizing the lack of motivation to use the resources of
alcohol abuse programs, Mrs. Mann struck out on a new trail,
developing new methodologies and new delivery techniques.
By 1965, there were close to 180 companies or agencies with
programs in effect. However, the Department of Defense was
not included at this time [3]. The Navy's primary treatment
was admission to one of the Navy hospitals, usually in the
Psychiatric ward where the doctors often knew less than the
patient about alcoholism:
"Treatment emphasis was on detoxification, medical manage-
ment, psychiatric observation and whatever benefits could
be derived from the hospital milieu."
16

There was so little understanding of alcoholism at this
point, that there are numerous documented cases where seda-
tives were prescribed for the chronic alcoholic in an attempt
to free them of the tension associated with the consumption
of alcohol. The problem was that alcohol, by nature, was a
depressant; therefore, the combination could have been quite
lethal.
In 1965, a retired Navy Commander entered the dispensary
at Naval Hospital, Long Beach, California, to address this
problem of treatment and was referred to Captain Joseph J.
Zuska, a staff psychiatrist, for further discussion. Command-
er Richard Jewell stated he was a recovering alcoholic and
was literally saved by Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) . His con-
cern was that the Navy had not assisted his recovery program
to any appreciable degree, but merely hospitalized him on no
less than seven occasions prior to his introduction to AA.
In not one instance did the Navy diagnosis his problem as
chronic alcoholism. Captain Zuska 's interest was nurtured
by the prospect of possibly saving others who had been denied
recognition and possible treatment of alcohol related problems
Commander Jewell offered his assistance by proposing to
conduct weekly AA meetings at the Long Beach Naval Hospital.
Attendees were to come through a medical referral or from
suspended sentences of non-judicial punishment of alcohol
related cases. The first Naval Alcoholics Anonymous was held
on 15 February 1965 with the Commanding Officer of Long Beach
17

Naval Hospital's support. As Captain Zuska relates, not
all went well on their first time at the starting gate:
"(It) took place with one alcoholic sailor, Dick Jewell,
two recovering alcoholics from the community, and a
practicing alcoholic Executive Officer of the station
who dropped in out of curiosity and brought his two
german police dogs. The picture of that first meeting
is still vivid-Dick and his friends attempting to read
from the Big Book, the intoxicated Executive Officer
trying to direct the meeting, two huge dogs pacing
rapidly about the room, and a bewildered sailor wonder-
ing what he had gotten himself into." [4]
The first 3 men who attended these meetings did not
recover, a success story a bit underwhelming; however, the
leaders were undeterred and continued to press on with the
meetings in a small conference room at the hospital. After
18 months these meetings grew to 25-30 men with measurable
results. Referrals for treatment were quickly increasing
in proportion to the recovery rate.
Commander Jewell had made his point. Captain Zuska re-
quested more area to hold the AA meetings from the Commanding




hut as a classroom. It was here in August 1967, on an out-
—
<&o
patient basis, that daily classes were held. It grew to
30-40 personnel in attendance, receiving lectures and holding
group discussion meetings. The group eventually moved to an
obsolete World War II barracks that had a large classroom
and bedding for inpatient care as additional medical techniques
were applied to the treatment [5]
.

Shortly after this move, the "Boot Legged" treatment
program was finally approved by the Chief of Naval Operations
as a pilot project under the Chief of Naval Personnel. No
other commands were notified of the new program authorization.
Due to lack of patient input and small staff, the output of
improved patients was low, although proportionally successful
in relation to the total. Discharge from the service for
those who couldn't cope with alcohol was the norm Defense
Department wide. The result was alcohol related disorders
in Veterans Administration Hospitals doubled between 1965
and 1969, the growth period of the Vietnam War. The treat-
ment center continued to press for recognition and sent a
letter in early 1970 requesting the establishment of 5 Alcohol
Rehabilitation Centers, including the one at Long Beach.
In May of 1970, despite the apparent success of the pilot
project, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a response via
the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery disapproving the installa-
tion of the 5 Alcohol Treatment Centers, but approving the
establishment of a formal education program. Sources disa-
gree on what exactly followed for the next year, but it is
known the Long Beach treatment program continued to function
with inpatient care.
C. CONCLUSIONS
During this period from 1965 to early 1970 the Alcohol
Rehabilitation Program was simply not defined. The illustration
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in Figure 1 is how the program appeared to the Navy. As a
shapeless structure, it was not supported nor accepted by
the organization. It had neither the people nor technology
to establish itself. The Navy organizational environment
was totally apathetic to its cause.
The Navy was unable or more likely, unwilling, to inte-
grate this budding program with its current goals, which were:
"To keep the seas open for commercial and military traffic
of all kinds. .. [which is] sea control, and to make it
possible to apply military power overseas ... [which is]
projection. " [6]
The intrusion in the system by the group at Long Beach
Naval Hospital, was tolerated because it was only a minor
deviation from an established support system (Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery) and placed outside its view.
It is easy to see why a program of this nature would be
ignored when there is an abundance of manpower available.
There is no reason to spend limited assets on social or re-
habilitation programs when the environment makes no demands.
The task facing the leaders of the new alcohol treatment
movement was to have an organization entrenched in tradition,
rigid in structure and innovation, recognize a revolutionary
idea that alcoholism was a disease and treatable for the
thousands who were afflicted. In addition, the system was
to provide the resources for treatment facilities and treatment
personnel. It is quite obvious that many puissant forces had
to occur concurrently before any movement toward recognition










"The hallmark of our age is the tension between
related aspirations and sluggish institutions"
John Gardner
A. FORCES AT WORK
Through the late 1960 's, not much had been done on the
drug or alcohol issue except the traditional Federal emphasis
on narcotics law enforcement [7] . Rehabilitation and educa-
tion had been basically ignored.
In spite of the credible independent work in Long Beach,
California, to establish a recognized Alcohol Rehabilitation
Center, little progress had been made in regard to institu-
tionalizing the program by the Navy. The rehabilitation
work was carried on by recovered alcoholics as unsponsored
crusaders. Without support, either external or internal to
the organization, the program had little chance for survival.
But as luck would have it, three major forces coalesced
during 1970-1971 to permit rapid expansion and entrenchment
of Alcohol Rehabilitation Programs. They were:
-The Vietnam War
-Selection of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt as Chief of Naval
Operations
-Passage of Public Laws 91-616 and 92-129
Each will be explored in some detail.
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The Vietnam War was the number one public concern of
1970, and was having tremendous impact throughout the stratum
of our society. In addition to the armed conflict making
daily news, there were other serious complications, that
of drug addiction of the personnel serving in-country.
Illicit drug usage had doubled every year from 1967 to 1969,
and showed no signs of relief from this frantic pace [8]
.
In Senate Hearings chaired by Senator Harold E. Hughes
in November and December of 1970, the representatives from
each branch of the armed services testified on the depth
and breadth of the problem. The outlook was not bright;
it was clear that the abuse of drugs was reaching epidemic
proportions [9]
.
According to a former White House staff member under
President Nixon, the coup de grace to the lingering ignor-
ance of drug addiction came in late 1970 with a Congressional
trip to Vietnam. The final report verified all the fears
of the public, there appeared to be widespread drug addiction
among our troops. This, combined with the other reports,
acted as a triggering mechanism for action. It became
apparent that the drug abuse enigma was no longer just a
law-enforcement problem, but required long range planning
for education, prevention and treatment.
The President was particularly sensitive to this issue
for two reasons. First, while campaigning in 1968, he had
promised a strong law and order administration and linked
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drug use and abuse to the rising rates. Failure to act
on this issue now vividly before the public, would seriously
damage his re-election in 1972. Secondly, President Nixon
perceived this issue of widespread addiction of those serving
in Vietnam as additional leverage for the moderates deepen-
ing drive to withdraw all allied forces from the country.
This would have been a deathblow to the President's Vietnam-
ization program.
The Domestic Council was asked by the President to look
into the problem. They reported a profusion of drug abuse
programs already in place, but so diffuse that they were
all but ineffective. As a means of uniting this fragmented
effort, the President issued an Executive Order creating the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP)
.
It was later legitimatized by Congress through special
Legislation, one of the few programs initiated by the Presi-
dent to pass unanimously.
The infusion of money into SAODAP was tremendous, a
total of $260 million out of a $370 million anti-drug budget
in the first year alone [10]. With dollars comes power.
While most other programs were being cut back during this
time period, the Drug Abuse Program, via SAODAP, was being
launched as the newest of the Nation's social action programs.
The result was quite predictable; Federal Departments and
Agencies recast their new programs into prevention of Drug




The second major force, selection of Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , was a surprise
to most everyone in 1970. Admiral Zumwalt was selected over
33 of his senior officers for nomination. At 49 he was one
of the youngest ever to serve as CNO. It was declared that
he was chosen to help bring the Navy into the modern age.
He was a non-traditionalist on his stand for programs for
people. While the Soviet Naval threat was markedly increas-
ing, our capabilities were in jeopardy, and not just in a
shortage of hardware. First term re-enlistment rates were
a shocking 9.5 percent in early 1970, the lowest since 1955
[11] . This was well below that necessary to man even a
minimum fleet. With mounting anti-militarism of the genera-
tion that was to fill these shortages, there was little
hope for an effective Navy in the near future if it continued
business as usual. In addition, the end of the draft was in
sight. Like it or not, the Navy would be all volunteer by
1973. His selection was preventive medicine for an ailing
system.
Clearly, things had to change. Admiral Zumwalt provided
the internal force for people oriented programs to be a
reality. This included elimination of many unnecessary
regulations and establishment of programs to assist active
duty members with their personal dilemmas. The Alcohol
Rehabilitation Program had received a powerful ally.
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The third major force was external in nature. The con-
cept of alcoholism as a genuine trouble spot in society has
been very slow in developing. The stigma attached to the
addicted drinker of alcoholic beverages was strong and deep.
In 1948, 50 percent of the people surveyed nationwide by
Rutgers University, believed alcoholics did not need treat-
ment and could stop whenever they wanted. Some ten years
later, in another nationwide survey, 58 percent of the
respondents thought the habitual drinker was sick instead
of morally weak as the first survey led one to believe. The
slow shift was a result of repeated statements by three
major organizations, the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies,
the National Council on Alcoholism and Alcoholics Anonymous,
that alcoholism was a treatable disease [12] . To the sup-
porters of Alcohol Treatment Programs, this disease concept
was fundamental for recognition of their activities. The
confusion of whether alcoholism was a personality disorder,
a physical illness, or a reaction to social status or struc-
ture, held up much of the research into treatment of those
beset. Identified as a disease it would force physicians
to gain knowledge and experience in treatment, induce hospitals
to accept alcoholics for inpatient care and rehabilitation,
expand research into the causes of alcoholism, and assist
in the identification of those afflicted. This long war of
recognition had few major successes until 1968 when President
Lyndon B. Johnson stated before Congress:
26

"The Alcoholic suffers from a disease which will yield
eventually to scientific research and adequate treatment.
Even with the present state of our knowledge, much can
be done to reduce the untold suffering and uncounted
waste caused by this affliction." [13]
True recognition was a heartbeat away. The follow-up
to this addressal, and another by President Nixon, led to
enactment of Public Law 91-616, "The Comprehensive Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1970." The precedent established by this act
permitted segments of the Federal Government to pursue
programs on alcohol rehabilitation.
In 1971, a bill specifically directed to the Department
of Defense was introduced as a rider to the Selective Ser-
vice Act by Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa. It reads in part:
"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and implement
procedures ... to identify, treat and rehabilitate mem-
bers of the Armed Forces who are drug or alcohol
dependent.
"
It was called Public Law 92-129.
This was the leverage necessary to justify many of the
programs in the Navy under design by recovering alcoholics.
It should be noted there was disagreement among the
early alcohol program leaders on the importance of these
public laws. It was felt by some that the program would
have developed exactly the same way without Public Law 91-616
and 92-129, and that this leverage was not necessary.
Others felt that these laws were pivotal.
27

B. USING THE FORCES
These three major forces merged within a 14 month period
and provided the opportunity for tremendous advancement in
recognition of Alcohol Rehabilitation Programs.
The problem facing those involved was how to use this
boost advantageously. Taking on a remedial enterprise with
zeal and enthusiasm is one thing; however, doing it effec-
tively is something else.
As indicated earlier in this chapter, Admiral Zumwalt
took his assignment as CNO in 1970. He recognized the drug
and alcohol problems almost immediately, but did not yet
have the financial resources to tackle the problem head on.
Using manpower instead, he assigned one of his best officers,
Captain Charles F. Rauch, as Special Assistant to the CNO
and Project Manager of the Human Relations Project Office.
In this capacity, Rauch was to coordinate the peoples program
advancements proposed by the CNO. This included the Drug
and Alcohol Program. At this point in time, the Drug Pro-
gram had been formulated and open for business, but hardly
what one would term, "established." The Alcohol Program was
non-existent except for a few dedicated folks at Long Beach
Naval Hospital. Rauch was introduced to an aggressive and
dynamic officer (and recovering alcoholic) , Captain James
Baxter, who convinced him that the Alcohol Rehabilitation
Programs needed recognition and leadership to get the project
underway. With the CNO and the Chief of Naval Personnel's
28

approval, Rauch selected Baxter as the Navy's Alcohol Abuse
Control Program's (NAACP) first Director. To get the Program
launched, 50,000 dollars was procured from the Naval Material
Command and they established an office in a little used
building at the Washington D.C. National Airport designated
as T-7. During the move to his new office Captain Baxter
was joined by two other recovering alcoholics and a disen-
chanted non-alcoholic secretary who believed this job had to
be better than her last. Although this does not appear to
be the solid support necessary to create a visionary program,
the atmosphere was just beginning to clear for the Alcohol
Program supporters.
The first big hurdle had been cleared. Due to the change
in leadership within the Navy, the internal force for refor-
mation had been strong enough to permit the crusading Alcohol
Rehabilitation personnel to get a foot in the door. Admiral
Zumwalt had identified Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation as
one of his goals in his charter of the new peoples programs.
For the next 6 months, creative methodologies abounded to
foray money from the Drug Program, which was gaining an infu-
sion of dollars as the SAODAP program was developing. With
this financial backing, the office grew and began designing
their future. Captain Baxter, as the senior zealot, preached
to all who would listen about the developing program. He
met with Captain Joe Zuska and Commander Dick Jewell of the
"unrecognized" Navy Alcohol Treatment Center in Long Beach,
29

to review their steps to alcohol recovery that had been
so painfully acquired over the last 5 years. With their
expertise and guidance, a model was formulated for additional
treatment centers if the idea could be sold the Navy
hierarchy.
Despite recognition by top management, no major innova-
tions or developments had been instituted yet. The growth
and expansion of the program was promising, but still tenuous
In September of 1971, Public Law 92-129 was passed by
Congress. In addition to directing the Secretary of Defense
to implement the Programs, it gave a deadline of 60 days
for action. The Alcohol Program personnel were well prepared
and now had reason to be truly optimistic about the future.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Alone, alcohol issues were still not a major public con-
cern despite its widespread misuse. Illicit drugs on the
other hand were apparently of grave concern. This split was
at odds with logic. The difficulty was the perception of
the problem.
Illicit drugs were a mystery to most of the middle to
upper age brackets in this country. It was difficult for
them to relate to a heroin addict, but probably a little
easier to understand an alcoholic since most had witnessed
alcohol abuse at some point in their lives. In addition,
alcohol was a legal substance.
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In reality, drug abuse involves both illicit substances
and alcohol. The division has partly been for identifica-
tion for law enforcement. The moral issues will not be
addressed here; however, effective rehabilitation often
includes the same model in addiction to either substance.
The attention given to heroin abuse in Vietnam was indeed
one of the catalysts for recognition of the alcohol problem.
It appears the Alcohol Rehabilitation Program had to ride
in on the coattails of the Drug Rehabilitation Program if
it was to get started at all.
For better or worse, the Department of Defense has usu-
ally been on the frontier of change on social policies.
This is true for a number of reasons, not the least of which
are that the military can be tightly controlled and changes
can be made unilaterally. All that is necessary is the
proper support from the hierarchy, and the external pressure
for change. During 1970-1971, the Alcohol Rehabilitation
Program had made major inroads to acceptance of its existence
It had penetrated the organizational sphere of the Navy as
illustrated in Figure 2. But it was far from developed as
a sub-unit.
The program was permitted to formulate under the direc-
tion of Admiral Zumwalt, but it was necessary to use the
external forces of the Vietnam War and two Public Laws to









It had an office, but was in a project status. No one was
quite sure what it was really supposed to do. It had the
flexibility to cross lines of authority throughout the Navy
to publicize its development but could not produce an approved
timetable for installation of various aspects of its program.
Even the technology of the program was ill-defined. The
ability to treat those addicted to alcohol had only been
proven on a small scale. What would happen when hundreds a
month, all across the country, would enter the program?
As those in the program recognized, the next step was
to solidify its standing with the Navy to enable it to
resolve the numerous problems. To ensure its assimilation
into the organization it must take additional steps. Section
IV will chart the course taken for the remainder of 1971 to








What eventually forced the issue of recognition of the
drug problem in this country was the perception that it was
rampant throughout the Armed Forces. The public demanded
action and the pressure for treatment and education programs
was high.
The military was in the forefront of the effort to ad-
dress the drug problem. As the Navy responded, some recover-
ing alcoholics on active duty (most schooled by Alcoholics
Anonymous) recognized this as an opportunity to expand their
work, much like an evangelist in a tribe of heathens. Their
job was to convince the Navy that alcohol abuse was at least
as bad as the public's perception of illicit drug use, if not
considerably worse.
These men were the pioneers of the new wave of rehabili-
tation efforts. They also were strong supporters of Alcoholics
Anonymous ' s twelfth step (Appendix A), that of helping others
with the same disease. This is a very important point.
They were the zealots and torchbearers of the way to recovery.
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They used the Navy as much as the Navy used them, both to
their mutual benefit. This was particularly important in
the years to follow, which will become clear in this Chapter.
B. THE TURBULENT YEARS
As stated in the last chapter, the Navy had actually
begun developing its Alcohol Rehabilitation Program prior
to Public Law 92-129 as a result of Admiral Zumwalt's Human
Goals Program. The Alcohol Program was, in fact, just one
aspect of this. The Human Goals Program also included race
relations, drug abuse, overseas diplomacy and organizational
development. Support by the Chief of Naval Operations was
assured if the Alcohol Program could prove its worth.
Upon opening their doors in August of 1971, the official
priorities for the young Alcohol Program were mixed. It is
speculated that certainly a major issue was the establishment
of the program as a true part of the Navy's support group.
Resources were extremely tight as evidenced by the limited
available manpower. Virtually all the funding came via the
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) vice the Medical Department,
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) . This is surprising
since much of the enlightened recognition of alcoholism as a
disease came from the American Medical Association, which
recognized it in 1956 [14] . As will be evidenced through




Other transitional problems were coming to light. The
original intention of the organization was to combine alcohol
and drug abuse under one Director according to early Bureau
of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) documents. The desired consoli-
dation of management efforts did not come to pass until years
later. At first glance, it appears that the Alcohol Program
would be accelerating its own demise by cutting itself from
assured funding. But to the Alcohol Program leaders, there
was a distinct methodology to their apparent suicidal tendency.
First, the personnel assigned to the Alcohol Program were
truly crusaders for rehabilitation. All had experienced the
horrors of alcohol dependence and worked their way back to a
normal life. This was not true of the drug rehabilitation
supporters. Virtually none of these were ex-users of illicit
drugs. The motivations for success were simply not the same.
Secondly, the average age of the alcohol addicted patient
was close to 30 years, and characteristically career oriented
in the Navy and with a family. The drug addicted patient was
considerably younger, closer to 20 years old, without ties
or established loyalty to the organization that was attempt-
ing to treat him/her. The investment by the Navy in training
was usually not very high. Moral issues aside, it may not
have been as cost effective to rehabilitate a younger drug
abusing sailor. Third, alcohol was legal while drugs gener-
ally were not. This brought in the punitive issue. Politi-
cally it was much easier to work with rehabilitation of legal
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of funding becomes very confusing. Much was taken from the
substance abuse than illicit drug abuse. Fourth, the Alcohol
Program Director was very senior and had direct access to
Rear Admiral Rauch, the Special Assistant to the CNO and
Project Manager of the Human Relations Project Office. This
resulted in little coordination with the Drug Rehabilitation
personnel. As a result, the leaders of the Drug and the
Alcohol Programs did not work together; each worked their
own program and own goals. The Alcohol Program desired no
association with the Drug Program. Each went about their
own business as two unattached entities in the Human Relations
Program, and it continued that way until 1978.
_____
Throughout these formative months, the cross walking
Drug Program since it was getting an infusion of funds, and
more was acquired through "creative procurement." No one
truly remembers where it all came from; it must have been
a most interesting time.
Meanwhile, the alcohol people continued their drive for
recognition. The first Alcohol Rehabilitation Center was
Captain Zuska's operation at Long Beach Naval Hospital. It
was officially recognized in August 1971. Designated as a
BUMED function, it forced continued participation of the
reluctant Medical Department.
By October of 1971, the NAACP personnel had their Alcohol
Program guidelines before the CNO. In thirty days the CNO
had approved the plan, in principle, to be developed as
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appropriate instructions and directives. In addition, he
approved the establishment of an Alcohol Rehabilitation
Center for the East Coast to be located in Norfolk, Virginia.
Unlike the first ARC in Long Beach, this was under the Chief
of Naval Personnel. This brought the operational wing of
the Navy into the alcohol rehabilitation business. Now both
the Medical Department and Line (operational Navy) were
responsible for treatment programs. The operation of both
clinics was basically the same. Utilizing Captain Zuska's
model of a multidisciplinary blend of medical treatment,
group therapy, education, spiritual reinforcement, and indi-
vidual counselling, they stimulated a desire in the patient
to develop a personal program of recovery. They relied very
heavily on Alcoholics Anonymous for continued support. It
was inpatient treatment for 6 weeks in both Centers. The
Norfolk Center proved as successful as the Long Beach one.
The Navy's para-professionals running the Program were
largely recovered alcoholics. This is one of the major
differences between the Navy's program and those of the Army
and Air Force. The Army/Air Force approach was centered on
the professional treatment specialists, those schooled in
rehabilitation efforts, but not experienced as a student.
This is to say that the Army and the Air Force rejected the
idea of recovered alcoholics helping alcoholics. The Navy
on the other hand, insisted that utilizing recovered alcoholics
was the only sensible approach. Not only were the leaders
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and majority of the personnel in the Alcohol Abuse office
all recovered alcoholics, but most of the Alcohol Abuse
Counselors were also. In addition, a referral network
(REFNET) of treated alcohol abusers was kept by the Program.
They were utilized for local command coordination of possible
alcohol abusers, education of command personnel, and visible
proof that recovered alcoholics could lead full and produc-
tive lives. As a result, the Navy far outdistanced both
the Army and Air Force in those early years in establishment
of working treatment programs.
Early in the Program, the NAACP knew how to employ the
Program to meet the ends of the Navy to obtain at least
minimal support. Since the Navy was an institution support-
ed by tax dollars and highly vulnerable to public opinion,
it had a paranoia about cost effectiveness. If a program
did not pay for itself in some manner, be it increased defense
capability or increased effective manpower, it was in a very
tenuous position for survival. The NAACP office took steps
from the very beginning to validate its cost. They could
present an imposing set of in-house cost effectiveness studies
based on the success rate of rehabilitation. The criteria
for success was self-generated in these early times. This
is not to state it was incorrect, but simply that the program
was self-evaluated for a number of years. There is no evi-
dence of resistance to these studies from any other source
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and no other models of "successful rehabilitation" surfaced
to challenge NAACP ' s . The program declared it was more than
paying for itself, and there appeared to be no argument.
Through 1971 and 1972 the goal developed by NAACP was
to "save lives." As viewed by the program leaders, recovery
was most effectively accomplished through treatment centers.
The drawback, as recognized by NAACP, was that the majority
of the funding was placed in treatment centers instead of
education.
This brings to light the classic argument of where to
start a program designed to terminate abuse. With limited
resources, it is impossible to effectively educate personnel
to prevent abuse and rehabilitate personnel who already are
abusers. The early decision was made to orient the program
toward rehabilitation of those who were abusers. "Save lives"
meant rehabilitation centers, and 8 5 percent of the funding
went to that goal. More importantly, the scarce billets
(authorized assignments of Naval personnel) were primarily
treatment oriented. Occasionally, bursts of money came
through for education issues, but no ongoing education was
designed by 1972.
Support continued to mount for justification of the
Alcohol Program. In March of 1972, the Department of Defense
issued Directive 1010.2, "Alcohol Abuse by Personnel of the
Department of Defense." It preceded a flood of similar
instructions by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval
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Operations (message Z-115) , Bureau of Naval Personnel and
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. All helped to identify
alcoholism as a treatable disease and pointed the way for
Naval Commands to follow for alcohol rehabilitation.
By the end of 1972, a third ARC had opened in Great
Lakes, Illinois. Other milestone events of significance
were
:
1. The tremendous number of briefings held for senior
officers in all types of Commands on alcohol abuse.
2. A CNO SITREP film on Alcohol Rehabilitation was
produced, distributed and shown Navywide.
3. "Chalk Talk on Alcoholism" by Father Martin, a
classic in alcohol abuse films, was distributed
throughout the Navy.
/4. A survey to follow-up on all treated patients every
6 months for two years to monitor their progress,
was initiated.
5. Establishment of a referral network of recovered
alcoholics who have volunteered to assist the Pro-
gram by helping the Commands they were currently
assigned. This volunteer program was very important
to the education program started in 1973.
6. Opening of the first Alcohol Rehabilitation Unit
(ARU) . It was at the Philadelphia Naval Hospital /'"'
and under the control of BUMED. All ARU ' s were
placed in Naval Hospitals. The program treatment
parallels that of the ARC ' s
.
It was a banner year for the program. The tremendous success
continued through 1973. Among the accomplishments were:
1. A continued growth in the recovered alcoholic network
program.
2. A comprehensive conference of all the Navy's Colleral
Duty Alcohol Counselors was held; the first of its kind
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in the Armed Services. Among the speakers were Mrs.
Marty Mann, founder of the National Council on Alcoholism,
Major General J. K. Singlaub, a Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense and Vice Admiral R. B. Baldwin, Deputy
Chief of Naval Personnel.
3. The fourth ARC was established in Naval Station San
Diego, California.
4. The first Alcohol Rehabilitation Drydock opened in at
Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Drydocks
were usually an outpatient local rehabilitation unit
for less serious cases of alcohol abuse.
5. The Alcohol Training Unit (ATU) was established at the
ARC San Diego to conduct education and training for
service personnel in all phases of alcoholism prevention
and rehabilitation.
6. Operating ARU's have expanded to 14 under BUMED control.
This was in addition to the 4 ARC ' s under BUPERS
.
7. Billets were available to fill all Human Resource Man-
agement Centers (HRMC's), then lost due to billet restruc-
turing. These billets were for Alcohol Abuse Control.
This was one of the few serious setbacks in the first
three years of operations.
8. The official name of the alcohol program was changed
from Navy Alcohol Abuse Control Program (NAACP) to Navy
Alcoholism Prevention Program (NAPP) . It is speculated
that possibly one of the reasons for change was to avoid
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confusion with the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) , but more likely was to
insure the word "prevention" appeared.
9. BUPERS fully funded BUMED ' s Medical Officers for atten-
dance to an American Medical Association conference on
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.
In addition, one of the most significant accomplishments of
1973 was the issuance of OPNAVINST 6330.1 in May. It was
an instruction to all the Navy titled "Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism among Naval Personnel." It stated in part:
"An initial BUPERS -sponsored survey of active duty per-
sonnel shows a need for concern over the relatively
large percentage of officers and enlisted members who
have experienced unfavorable social consequences, behav-
ior problems, impaired performance of duty, damage to
health, injury, or financial and family problems, related
to drinking. These habitual alcohol abusers may be
alcoholics or potential alcoholics. Alcohol abuse and
alcoholism to any degree constitutes an unacceptable
loss to the Navy in training, investment and operational
efficiency and a high cost in resources and human
suffering.
"
One of the most important issues addressed through this
instruction was that of establishment of education and train-
ing programs. Support had now gone full circle. Education
was to receive attention as the means to avoid the continual
necessity to build additional ARC ' s and ARU ' s . Through these
and additional guidelines formulated earlier in the program




With monthly referrals into the rehabilitation system
over double those in the late part of 1972, it was recog-
nized that prevention was the key, and this would come about
primarily through education. As stated by one of the Com-
manding Officers of an Alcohol Rehabilitation Center:
"When we're dealing with alcoholism we are dealing with
a person already fallen to the bottom of the cliff...
what we want to do is build fences at top to avert fall-
ing... that is prevention."
All that remained was the method. The model that was
decided on was already in place at the Department of Trans-
portation. Work was begun to make it a reality.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The task for these turbulent years for the Alcohol
Rehabilitation Program was three-fold:
1. Develop the Program quickly.
2. Protect what has been accomplished.
3. Formalize the Program.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the program had taken form
and almost been assimilated into the Naval organization by
1973. The problems facing NAACP in accomplishing their
task were typical of any new project; i.e., dollars and
recognition.
Like most large organizations, the Navy has major depart-
ments competing for scarce resources of manpower and money.
These departments, surface, subsurface and air are all very







"Line." There are never enough dollars to buttress them
all as they desire, therefore, difficult compromises must
be made in accordance with the parent organizations ' ultimate
goals. For support sub-units and programs to survive, sac-
rifices must be made by the major departments. This brings
us back to justification or cost effectiveness of the program
under scrutiny.
In this case, the leaders displayed their cost effective-
ness continually. Figures showed the entire HRM Program
could have been cost supported on the success of the Alcohol
Rehabilitation Program alone. More importantly, these figures
were believed by the CNO. This assured the latitude for the
completion of the first task, develop the program quickly.
Virtually every step was cost effective to the Navy
according to Alcohol Program leaders, and the various levels
of command were all briefed to that effect. It follows then,
by building a firm foundation of support it will assist the
second task, to protect what has been accomplished. The new
program was allowed in, and was now fenced with money and
manpower (although still limited) . The budget for fiscal
( 7
year 1973 was 5.5 million dollars, a far cry from the
50,000 dollars used to get the program started.
The third task, that of formalization was fulfilled
through a myriad of instructions from all levels of the
Navy, and development of a formal chain of command. The
program was currently under development to be absorbed
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permanently under the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel
for Human Goals. This was finally completed in early 1974.
The Alcohol Program was in the unusual position of con-
trolling its own destiny at this time. It was still young
and restless, with highly motivated and vocal zealots con-
trolling its growth. There is little doubt they were highly
innovative. The lack of control over the Program by the
parent organization was tolerated in these early stages.
The members involved had very specialized skills and their
commitment to the alcohol rehabilitation movement was never
in doubt. They caused little disruption of the system as a
whole and, in fact, provided an outlet for unit Commanding
Officers to send many of their problems.
While survival was slowly being assured, there were changes
that would have to be made for total integration into the Navy.
This is the subject of the next chapter.
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V. GROWING UP (1974-1977)
"When I am grown to man's estate
I shall be very proud and great
and tell the other girls and boys
not to meddle with my toys"
Robert Louis Stevenson
A. INTRODUCTION
This period from 1974 to early 1977 was an extremely
critical time. While well established in the field of treat-
ment and still expanding, alcohol abuse education was seen
by the Alcohol Program leaders as the Program for the future.
Treatment centers were overflowing with patients, and the
waiting lists were getting longer. What was recognized was
that little was being done in prevention of abuse and ulti-
mately prevention of the influx of personnel into treatment.
One result of this concern was development of the Navy Safety
Action Program (NASAP) . It was patterned from a current
education package in the Department of Transportation.
As an interim means to solve the shortage of spaces in
the ARC's and ARU^s was the expansion of a program called
Drydock. It was a local program for local commands to treat
less serious cases of alcohol abuse. It was in place in
1973, but true recognition and funding took place in 1974,
by the Chief of Naval Personnel.
48

It was also during this time that the Alcohol Abuse
Program was totally integrated into the Navy structure. It
had become a formal sub-unit and was adapting to the Navy
way of doing business. But the leaders of the Alcohol Pro-
gram were still far from being average Naval Officers. They
continued to be aggressive and sometimes abrasive in promo-
tion of their programs. Their effectiveness was spectacular.
B . GROWTH
It would have been a pleasure for the Alcohol Program
personnel to state they had convinced all commands that the
Program was an answer to their problems . Such was not the
case. Much support had been gained and their reputation was
excellent. However, as Dr. Zuska relates, the Program still
had some problems:
"One follow-up letter from the Commanding Officer of a
ship complimented us on having cured a petty officer
of his alcoholism because 'one of my officers tried for
four hours to buy him a drink and he refused. ' The let-
ter was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel as a
example of dubious support for a recovering alcoholic."
[15] .
People knew of the Program but did not yet understand
alcoholism.
As stated in the last chapter, the Navy recognized the
means to slow the building tide of referrals to ARU ' s and
ARC's, was through a prevention and education program. It
was assumed that education was a method of prevention. That
if the abusers knew what the alcohol was doing to their
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body and mind, they would rationally avoid abuse. This
may not always be the case and some studies have refuted
this technique and the assumptions that nonabuse is educable.
But the true results of their efforts would not be seen for
years, but it was felt the attempt had to be made.
The impetus for starting the Prevention Program was
OPNAVINST 6330.1. It stated in 1973 that the Naval Safety
Center was tasked:
"in conjunction with CHNAVPERS . .
.
( to) conduct direct
liaison with appropriate officers of the U.S. Department
of Transportation aimed at developing Alcohol Safety
Action Programs (ASAP) for implementation at all Navy
shore installations."
To understand the development of this Program, it will
be necessary to reflect a bit. The Highway Safety Act of
1966 required the Secretary of Transportation to complete
a study of the relationship between the consumption of alco-
hol and highway safety. Two years later the startling results
were that the use of alcohol led to 25,000 automobile related
deaths and at least 800,000 automobile collisions in this
country a year. The National Highway Safety Administration
was tasked to take action. The result was a program funded
through the Department of Transportation called the Alcohol
Safety Action Program (ASAP). There were eventually 35 ASAP '
s
established throughout the country. The Program was one of
cooperation with the courts for alcohol related traffic
offenses and development of a school for drivers convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol. Diagnosis was
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made to determine if a driver was a problem drinker and
check the degree of involvement with alcohol. Referrals
could then be made to local hospitals, or rehabilitation
units, if necessary [16].
The Navy recognized this as a program it could use to
initiate its own prevention and education service. Preven-
tion was defined as possibly educating the alcohol abuser
prior to his becoming an alcoholic necessitating treatment
at an ARC or ARU. Education was being an awareness of the
disease of alcoholism and where it ultimately leads. The
NASAP program does even more than this, which will be ad-
dressed shortly.
A Navy ASAP planning committee was devised to formulate
the program. It included representatives from the Navy
Safety Center, BUPERS , National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, the Fairfax Virginia ASAP and one representative
from an ARC and one from a Human Resources Management Center.
The program was to be called the Navy Alcohol Safety Action
Program (NASAP)
.
Even with this, funding and personnel support was diffi-
cult to acquire. It required the alcohol program leaders
to again apply "creative procurement" techniques and secure
a billet from the Chief of Naval Education and Training
through their Navy Education and Training Center. A retired
LCDR, George Gilpin, was picked as the first officer in charge
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of the project in Pensacola. He previously worked at the
CAAC there, and had experience and contacts throughout the
Pensacola area.
Commander G. R. Bunn was assigned to put the program
together. He commuted from his office in Washington D.C.
to Pensacola, and designed the program with Gilpin.
It was realized early by these coordinators of NASAP
,
that they were getting into an arena of specialized instruc-
tional skills necessary to pursue the prevention process.
Academic expertise was necessary if this were to be a success-
ful endeavor. The University of West Florida, located in
Pensacola, was brought in through Philip E. Bromley, PhD.
This was the academic capability needed to design the nuts
and bolts of the curriculum.
By March of 1974, the efforts were formally recognized
in a message from the Chief of Naval Personnel to the Chief
of Naval Education and Training stating:
"...that NASAP is one of the solutions to the problem
drinker/alcoholic ... (and it is desired) to establish
(a) pilot NASAP in the Pensacola area. (The) entire
project will be funded by BUPERS through FY 76."
Assistance for development for NASAP would be through
administration and training by the Department of Transporta-
tion and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol-
ism for the first three months.
The project site, Pensacola, was chosen for a number of
reasons. First, the only Alcohol Rehabilitation Drydock (ARD)
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in the continental United States recently opened in Pensacola.
Secondly, Florida was very pro-active and very supportive of
alcohol abuse programs. This was very necessary for court
referrals to the Program. Thirdly, the University of West
Florida was available for academic support. Finally, Pensacola
was a relatively stable area for active duty service members.
Units did not deploy as done in other large Naval installa-
tions so follow up investigations could be done easily.
Agreements were established with local county courts and
the State of Florida Probation and Parole Office for liaison
if a Naval/Marine active duty member were cited or arrested
for alcohol related incidents. In most cases, after civil
screening, the individuals apprehended were to be referred
to NASAP for prevention education and additional screening.
Court referrals began in August 1974 and the first NASAP
class started September 1974.
It was a 36 hour, 6 week program done in the evening
during the service members non-working hours. The goals
and framework for NASAP appear in Appendix B. Literally
hundreds went through the Program as a pilot project. It
proved so successful that in 1976 a formal request for expan-
sion was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel Operations.
Eleven sites were immediately approved.
As ultimately developed, the University of West Florida
was contracted to provide all activities relative to educa-
tional screening, classroom coordination, education records,
and facilitation of the actual classes.
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With NASAP designed to assist eventual reductions in
necessary referrals to overflowing ARC ' s and ARU's, an
interim program currently in place, was expanded to relieve
the lengthening, waiting lines for treatment. The Program
was called Drydock. This should not be confused with a Dry-
docker program started by Dr. Zuska's treatment center in
1965. That was groups of treatment program graduates start-
ing local Alcoholic Anonymous meetings wherever they were
currently assigned.
Drydocks were to be sponsored by BUPERS , acting jointly
with major operational commands to allow the smaller commands
under their jurisdiction to rehabilitate less serious cases
of alcohol abuse, on site.
In a speedletter sent by Rear Admiral Rauch in August
of 1974, it was declared that new funding was available for
26 additional sites (added to the 4 currently in place) . It
allocated up to 20,000 dollars annually per site, plus billets
for trained counselors if none were available at the local
command. What was significant about this development was
the attempted integration of some ARD ' s into Counseling and
Assistance Centers (CAAC) . At this time CAAC ' s were primarily
designed for drug abuse counseling. The Alcohol Program was
moving to integrate the services of drug and alcohol abuse
programs. It is speculated this was not necessarily to stream-
line the abuse efforts, in light of the feelings the alcohol
abuse personnel had for the drug abuse personnel, but rather
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to stretch available alcohol program funds as far as possible.
This is the first overtly combined effort of Drug and Alcohol
Abuse Programs found.
The treatment at Drydocks was similar in format to the
programs at ARC ' s and ARU ' s , only abbreviated. It provided 2,
for 2 weeks inpatient care, 4 weeks where the patient would
spend a half a day at work and a half a day at the ARD.
Following the sixth week there would be an additional 10
week follow-up with once a week sessions for the patient with
a counselor.
It was for those less serious alcohol abuse cases this
was designed. The local commanders now had a program of
their own. The limited information available indicates that
this Program was also very successful.
The year turned out to be a very good one for the Alcohol
Program. Other significant events in 1974 were:
1. The ARC in Jacksonville opened, bringing the total treat-
ment centers under BUPERS control to 4.
2. "The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Preven-
tion, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974"
was signed by Congress. It authorized a total of 361
million dollars to be used by the Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism Programs nationwide through 1976. This was a
significant increase over previous Federal funding, but
it still trailed drugs in total funding.
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3. ARC Long Beach was transferred to Naval Hospital Long
Beach and designated as an ARU under BUMED. It had pre-
viously been under BUMED but nonetheless designated as
an ARC because it was not established in the hospital.
4. Increased pressures from major commands on subordinate
commands to deemphasize the use of alcohol. For example,
in early 1974 the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, sent
out a personal letter to all his commanders, commanding
officers and of ficers-in-charge, to review management
policies in clubs and messes. It directly referred to
deemphasizing practices which may lead to overindulgence
such as drinking contests, two for one drinks to a single
customer and last calls designed to promote last minute
sales. The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet
sent out a similar request for review by message in Sep-
tember 1974.
5. Expanding cooperation by large commands. This was reflect-
ed by their requests for workshops and presentations on
alcohol abuse. One such example was the Chief of Naval
Air Training's request for alcohol abuse presentations
from the NAPP office in Washington D.C. for his Training
Wings in south Texas. It covered senior officers, flight
instructors, flight students and enlisted members of
the Wings. All were well attended.
6. The Alcohol Rehabilitation Program was removed from a
project status in concert with the Human Goals Program.
This meant that billets and funds were no longer fenced.
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Things did not appear to open well for the Navy's Alcohol
Programs in 1975. A Navy contracted study called "Final
Report on a Service Wide Survey of Attitudes and Behavior of
Naval Personnel Concerning Alcohol and Problem Drinking" was
submitted to the Chief of Naval Personnel. It was done by
the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. (BSSR) . It had
been conducted to accurately determine the scope of the alco-
hol problem in the Navy to permit projections of the programs
for the future. In addition, it was to assist the Navy in
pinpointing major causes of alcohol abuse. Jack Anderson,
a well known syndicated columnist, obtained a copy and wrote
an article citing the report. The title was "Drunken Sailor
Image Seems True" and the inference was that little was being
done to rectify the problem [17]
.
The report did show a very high alcohol abuse rate among
Navy personnel, and did pinpoint the problem areas as origi-
nally intended. The negative publicity, however, was a two-
edged sword. It also supported the alcohol programs contention
that alcohol abuse was a truly significant problem in the Navy.
Quickly on the heels of this study was another by the
U.S. Government Accounting Office on a comparison of the
military's Drug and Alcohol Program. It showed the need to
recognize alcohol abuse as the number one drug problem [18]
.
This was the same call voiced by a special committee in the
American Medical Association (AMA) in the middle of 1975.
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With this kind of documented support, the Alcohol Program
was able to hammer home the issue of alcohol beverage sales
and service. It called for and received:
1. Elimination of miniature and pint bottles of alcohol
in all Navy Package stores under the notion that they
could be conceivably be concealed by the patron at
work.
2. All bars and lounges, and other alcoholic beverage
retail outlets in the Navy, must have coffee and soft
drinks available. In addition, all of these establish-
ments open during noon hours, must have food service.
3. A requirement for all messes to provide family oriented
facilities that are not centered around the bar/cocktail
lounge.
4. A reduction of Happy Hours to once a week.
As the Alcohol Program entered a new year, 1976, it was
on solid ground. It had been hit with cutbacks in personnel,
but this was Navy wide. Most support groups were suffering
from similar cuts due to overall budget reductions. By 1976,
over 51,000 resident and outpatient personnel had undergone
treatment. Clearly the Program was established. The budget
for alcohol programs had climbed to over 8.8 million dollars
a year. By the end of the year:
1. Twenty-six alcohol education/training seminars were
conducted in the field for over 2,000 Naval Command-
ing Officers, Executive Officers, Navy Lawyers (JAG),
and Medical Officers.
2. The Chief of Naval Education and Training, integrated
alcohol and drug education into all Naval schools
under it's command.













It is interesting to note that all 14 ARU's-in place in
1976 under BUMED, were partially funded by BUPERS . In addi-
tion, a new program just getting underway with Medical Officers
attending a two week course on alcoholism at ARU Long Beach,
was funded by BUPERS
.
The major setback for the year appears to be the closure
of the ARC at Great Lakes. A Congressional report stating
the Military had too many counselors was released. The report
included counselors at ARC ' s and Drug Rehabilitation Centers,
as well as unit career counselors, staff chaplains and psy-
chologists. This was one of many times the Congress had
raised the issue of excessive counseling, but this required
action by the Navy. It demanded visible cuts of personnel
in these positions. The Alcohol Program was no exception,
and was told to reduce counseling billets. The feeling among
the leaders of the Program was that a worldwide, across-the-
board reduction would weaken the Program far worse than the
alternative they ultimately selected. The decision was made
to close a center despite the backlog of patients. The extra
personnel gained from the shutdown of ARC Great Lakes would
be used in other capacities; however, a number remained to
give the Program flexibility to assist NASAP and other new
ideas
.
The first few months of 1977 were relatively quiet, but
major changes were in the wind. There was much talk of com-
bining Drug Abuse and Alcohol Abuse into one office and a
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major restructuring of BUPERS appeared imminent. The effect
of these, and other changes on the Alcohol Program, already




It was during this period that there was full assimila-
tion of the Alcohol Program into the Navy. The Program had
become relatively immune to the environment external to the
Navy. This means that the suffering of budget cutbacks, etc.,
was generally directed to the entire Navy and the Alcohol
Program must only pay its fair share instead of fighting for
survival. The assimilation of the Program is illustrated in
Figure 4. The only external environment it must now realis-
tically worry about is that of the Navy itself.
There was little doubt the Program fought hard to vali-
date its worth and publicize its services Navy wide. It
responded to Congressional calls for Alcohol Rehabilitation
Programs for the Navy, and managed to stay at least one step
ahead of Alcohol Program demands placed on the Navy by the
Department of Defense. Despite a reduction in manpower and
a shortage of trained counselors, it proved to all who would
listen that the Alcohol Program was assisting the Navy. It
had claimed it had rehabilitated thousands of well-trained
personnel and returned them to duty, saving the organization







worldwide to provide assistance without the typical penalties
of additional administrative burdens to those commands. It
was a call to take the troublesome alcoholic from the command
and return to them a far better worker in a few weeks , with-
out cost or obligation. The Program was marketed well by
these innovators.
In servicing the needs of the Navy, the Alcohol Program
had served itself. As stated previously, the leadership of
the Program were generally Alcoholics Anonymous Alumni. They
had the power and opportunity to do more for alcoholism in
the Armed Forces than anyone before them. The A. A. twelfth
step (Appendix A) is a true calling for those recovering from
a bout of alcoholism. It was probably never used as effec-
tively as it had been in the Navy from 1971-1977. Virtually
every major decision made on alcohol abuse covering 500,000
Naval members was "ghost written" by recovered alcoholics
in NAPP . They changed policies of Navy enlisted, non-
commissioned officer and officer clubs around the world. In
addition, they were generating a self-renewal capacity for
the Program through the 20,000 Navy and Marine personnel
rehabilitated annually. They also used the Navy's sensitivity
to alcohol abuse to gain support from major commands for
treatment programs
.
It was now under the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel
for Human Resource Management and left the project status.
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It had been recognized by the Navy as a bona fide sub-unit
in support of it's forces. With its new found security the
Program leaders took advantage of the opportunity.
The name of the Program had changed to the Navy Alcohol
Prevention Program (NAPP) in 1973. It was now able to take
advantage of the prevention label. With the treatment cen-
ters structurally sound within the organization and being
utilized to capacity, the leaders of the Alcohol Program
thought it advantageous to reorient the Program to preven-
tion and education. NASAP was virtually an undisputed success
But the Navy still had a problem. The Alcohol Program
and personnel were still highly aggressive and innovative.
The Alcohol Program appeared to be quite successful, but the
Navy had little control over some of its leaders. These
leaders had little to lose personally by fighting or manipu-
lating the system. They were not out to further their own
careers, but perceived themselves as "saving lives." This
was a strong motivation indeed. Also, the specialized skills
necessary to operate the Alcohol Program were new to the
Navy. The treatment was generally nonroutine. Every patient
presented unique problems and the Program was heavily oriented
toward the Social Sciences rather than the "Hard Sciences."




VI. BUREAUCRAT I ZING (1977-1980)
"We trained hard... but every time we were
beginning to form up into teams , we would
be reorganized. I was to learn later in
life that we tend to meet any new situation
by reorganizing ... and a wonderful method
it can be for creating the illusion of





As stated in the last chapter, the Program had been fully
assimilated by the Navy by 1977. While this had the advan-
tage of assured funding, manpower and recognition, it also
created problems for the Alcohol Problem.
Acceptance by the Navy for this unusual service to it's
members did not come without cost to the Program leaders.
The immediate result in these later years was loss of program
flexibility and a lower tolerance level by the Navy for the
innovators' style of "creative" leadership.
It was true the need by the Navy had been recognized,
but now it appeared inevitable that the parent organization
was moving to resolve this need in its own style. Among the
issues facing the Alcohol Problem from the Navy during this
time period were:
1. A movement by the Navy to merge the Alcohol and Drug
Program into one office, under one director.
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2. Control of NADAP from a single point instead of the
current diffusion of reporting requirements.
3. The merging of CAAC ' s and ARD ' s , since many were
co-located.
4. Removal of NASAP from the control of the Commanding
Officer, ARC, San Diego, to Chief of Naval Education
and Training (CNET) , located in Pensacola.
5. The drive to combine the ARC ' s (a line function) and
ARU's (a BUMED function) to come under BUMED control
exclusively. This would eliminate the line function
from the inpatient treatment process.
Not all of these issues are resolved today. The resis-
tance was high against changing the direction of the Alcohol
Program by it's leaders. The ability of these personnel to
hold back the pressure being applied by the Navy is in doubt
This chapter will review these and other applicable
issues
.
B. THE CHANGING WIND
The changes foreseen in 1976 by the Alcohol personnel
in their organizational makeup, were about to be implemented
Just prior to mid-1977, the Alcohol Abuse and Drug Abuse
Programs were combined under one head. It was stated the
merger was to form a single, integrated administrative divi-
sion for the two programs. The program was called Navy
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program (NADAP) and was under the
management control of the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel
for Human Resources Management (Pers-6).
The affiliation with the Drug Program occurred much to





However, the leaders of NAPP saw no need for immediate alarm.
They knew the first NADAP Director would be an Alcohol Pro-
gram representative by virtue of seniority. With their man
at the head, the merging of the two programs could then have
meant a reallocation of personnel and dollars currently de-
voted to Drug Abuse Programs. The real result of this marriage
is not clear due to conflicting data; however, the Alcohol
Program lost little ground initially and continued to press
for additional Alcohol Program funding. The Drug Abuse Pro-
gram was not nearly as visible in the literature reviewed.
The Alcohol Program did make some gains, by the end of
the year:
1. Two hundred doctors were trained at ARS Long Beach's
Alcoholism Orientation Course.
2. Over 1,000 Navy Chaplains, both active duty and reserve,
completed a 3-day workshop on alcoholism.
3. Thirty Alcoholism panel presentations were presented
to Naval forces in the United States as well as the
Western Pacific, by the Commanding Officer ARU Long
Beach and the current Director of NADAP.
4. Eleven NASAP sites were manned and operating by October
with a total of 13 expected shortly.
5. Fifty CAAC/ARD ' s were in operation. Some had combined
services by the end of the year.
6. Eighteen ARU ' s were operating in Naval Hospitals.
7. Close to 20,000 had received rehabilitation or assistance
for their alcohol problem this year.
8. The Program began development of a 5-year plan for
Human Resource Management, of which NADAP was a part.
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With the merging of the Alcohol Program and Drug Program
came additional calls from the Chief of Naval Personnel for
streamlining the NADAP system. Some of the problems addressed
in the introduction of this chapter surfaced in late 1977.
Specifically, the merger of the Alcohol and Drug Program had
taken place, and the combining of ARD's and CAAC's appeared
imminent
.
By 1978, this marriage of ARD's and CAAC's had come to pass.
The ARD name was dropped and all their services moved into
the CAAC's with which they were co-located. The stated purpose
was to provide stronger, more comprehensive facilities to
the abuser of drugs/alcohol, and the newest phenomena, the
polyuser. This was the Navy man or woman that was abusing
both drugs and alcohol (a former Commanding Officer of an
ARU prefers the title "chemical gourmet").
The CAAC's were formally centers dedicated to the drug C
abuser. They were under the control of local commanders.
The advantage of this local control was the accessibility
of the Program to the personnel assigned to the area. The
disadvantage was that the effectiveness of the CAAC was
directly dependent on the involvement of this local commander.
He/she held the purse strings. The result was the extreme
variance of effectiveness of the CAAC's. Some were truly
outstanding, others were close to closing.
In addition, the CAAC's did not enjoy a good reputation
throughout the Navy. Many were perceived by senior officers
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as a "babysitting" service for the personnel who couldn't
cope. The CAAC's did little to alleviate these feelings of
distrust in their early development. For example, there
were a few that had classroom walls painted in vivid colors
and covered with posters of popular band members, etc. The
grooming standards of some counselors attached were consid-
erably less than that tolerated by more conservative Naval
personnel
.
The assignment personnel in Washington D.C. were adding
to these problems. Formally CAAC's were designed to be headed
by full lieutenants or warrant officers. Instead, very young
and inexperienced officers, ensigns or fresh lieutenant junior
grades were assigned (primarily females) . They generally did
not have the experience or power to fight for their Center's
survival. This added to the fact that little coordination
among the CAAC's was being done; the CAAC system was getting
into trouble. Only a few CAAC's were perceived by their local
commanders as serving the needs of their commands. This also
remains an outstanding problem that must be resolved before
the real effectiveness of this system can be felt.
There was another major occurrence to impact the Alcohol
Program in 1978. There had been a Congressionally directed
split of; one, policy and planning; and, two, implementation
and operations, in the Navy's Personnel branch. The organi-
zational responsibility was to be divided between the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (manpower, personnel and training)
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for policy and planning, and the Naval Military Personnel
Command (NMPC) for implementation and operations. For the
programs addressed in this study, it became Op-15 and NMPC-6,
respectively.
The new NMPC-6 (old Pers-6) was still responsible for
the NADAP facilities; e.g., ARC ' s through NMPC-63. However,
the rest was quite confusing, especially in policy develop-
ment. The question was, who was really creating a compre-
hensive policy statement? It was only a slight exaggeration
for the Alcohol Program leaders to shrug their shoulders and
declare "Who's in charge here?" This had not been resolved
prior to the split other than in general terms. The Centers
in the field had little insight on why the change happened
in the first place, and ultimately what had really changed.
There are currently two NMPC-6 representatives in Op-15,
but their mission is not clear, at least as far as the NADAP
personnel in the field believe. Meetings are currently on-
going to resolve these problems at the time of this study.
It must be noted the Navy was forced into this transition,
but they had also failed to smooth out the process. The split
was to allow for more effective management of Naval programs.
It may in fact turn out that way, but not without a consider-
able amount of additional homework on the process.
The final major action for 1978 was BUMED's assumption
of total control of ARU ' s . They assimilated all ARU ' s into
functional departments of Naval Hospitals and changed the
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name to Alcohol Rehabilitation Services (ARS) . The method-
ology for treatment of the abuser was unchanged.
As a review, by 1979 there were 3 ARC * s , 24 ARS ' s , 66
CAAC ' s , and 18 NASAP sites in operation. These continued
to treat thousands annually. NADAP would address the work
of these centers and services in their information bulletin.
They also broke out the results of the Drug Program which
was not nearly as dramatic. The emphasis clearly remained
on the Alcohol Program and virtually all subsequent Directors
of NADAP were recovered alcoholics.
Milestone events for 1979 are few. The leadership was
coping with their new responsibilities and loss of flexibility
with the Op-15/NMPC-6 split. There were still not enough
counselors to handle the long waiting lines for entry into
treatment. It appears that limited space was available to
treat additional patients, but the shortage of personnel
made the task impossible. The manpower problem was being
felt Navy-wide. Most all commands, including the support
units, were giving up a "fair share" amount. The Program had
slipped into a "station keeping" position. It was fully
supported financially, and manpower was provided in accordance
with shortages present throughout the Navy, but few innova-
tions were now made or in fact tried. The budget for dedi-
cated Alcohol Programs was level at 12 million dollars for




Another peculiar phenomena was taking place at the treat-
ment centers. The average age of the typical patient was
younger. The patient of 1971-1975 was typically over 25
years old, but now the trend was reversing. It was obvious






There was a great deal of concern over this issue for
a number of reasons. First, a great many of the younger
abusers were polyusers, so confusion reigned on which prob-
lem to deal with first, alcohol or drugs. Second, the
concern was that with a shortage of personnel in most jobs
throughout the Navy, the older technically proficient sailor
who was an alcohol abuser, was now being tolerated by the
commands. The feeling being that an alcoholic on the job
is better than none at all. No replacements for the command
was possible when a patient was admitted to a Center. Finally,
the success rate of rehabilitation of the younger abuser
was significantly below that of the older patient. These
concerns also are unresolved to date. The basic difficulty
was how to measure these enigmas.
Truly, the Program desired to help those in need but it
also had to pay its own way. One can appreciate the dilemma
of the Program leaders. It was faced with a younger patient
that was harder to treat. In addition, the Program felt,
but did not know, that the real, older, alcoholics were being
hidden by commanding officers because of personnel shortages.
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This meant their primary goal of "saving lives" was perceived
to be stagnating. Finally, in justifying the Alcohol Abuse
Program, it is difficult to display sliding success rates
without considerable explanation.
By comparison, 1980 was even a more bothersome year from
the perspective of the Program leaders. Studies both by
internal sub-units and contracted organizations external to
the Navy were taken to review cost effectiveness and justifi-
cations for the Alcohol Programs
.
The most significant of these studies was done by Burt
Associates, Incorporated, titled "Worldwide Survey of Non-
medical Drug Use Among Military Personnel, 1980." It was a
sweeping study touching on all aspects of drug and alcohol
abuse. Conclusions were not drawn by the contracted con-
sultants, but the charts clearly illustrated the story. The
Navy was an abuse leader in many of the categories under
alcohol and drug problem areas [19] . This was released to
major commands in late December 1980. The effects are not
obvious at this time but it is speculated the Alcohol and
Drug Program will get additional attention due to this per-
petually festering problem. At the very least, it certainly
will result in the typical "knee jerk" reaction of additional
studies in an attempt to localize the problem.
Other major problems addressed in 1980 by major studies,
were the proposed integration of NASAP into CNET control and





The intriguing part about these problems was the addressal
of the same proposals of their unification virtually every
year since the birth of the ARC ' s in 1971 and NASAP in 1974.
This was not fresh news to either one of these programs.
Both suggestions were categorically rejected by early Alcohol
Program leaders who convinced their boss that these moves
were most impractical. This was able to be done in those
early development years without much required justification.
Today the powerbase is not the same, and neither are the
personnel
.
The criticism leveled at NASAP was the control of the
Program being held in ARC San Diego. The flow was not logi-
cal to those reviewing the organizational structure. The
Navy had been touting this program as preventive education.
Why then, was it operated from an ARC, a treatment center;
why wasn't it controlled by Chief of Naval Education and
Training in Pensacola?
One obvious reason was the fact that the Commanding
Officer of ARC San Diego was a founding father of NASAP in
1974. The Program was carried with him when assuming duties
at the San Diego ARC. A second reason for the placement at
an ARC, was to utilize the expertise of ARC personnel in
continuing development of NASAP. Treatment and rehabilita-
tion are two completely different worlds in the civilian
community, with no interchange of information. It was felt
the move to an ARC would provide more necessary coordination
73

between the Programs. This interchange was paramount if
NASAP ' s success were to continue. Third, a high number of
NASAP referrals are screened for additional treatment to
ARC's or ARS ' s . Estimates are as high as 15 to 20 percent,
stating that, "CNET would not have that expertise or capability
for control if it was held in Pensacola."
The move to CNET has been dismissed by program leaders
as impractical and they felt strongly that it should remain
in the rehabilitation network. CNET apparently does not
desire, or is not ready, to crusade for acquiring NASAP. No
documentation was found concerning CNET ' s opinion.
The move to integrate the ARC ' s and ARS ' s was even more
perplexing. This had been addressed since Captain Zuska's
Center became officially operational in 1971. It has been
recommended in not less than 3 major studies, yet it was
rejected each time.
The argument to unite the services and centers appears
to be quite logical. It was felt that consolidation of
assets would improve utilization, increase efficiency and
assist coordination. The major argument, however, was that
if alcoholism was a disease as the Program personnel had
professed since the beginning, why wouldn't it be better in
a hospital environment?
The emotion tied to this issue can not be underestimated.
The fight to keep the Navy Alcohol Services and Centers
split, was apparently a threat to the entire issue of
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rehabilitation in the Navy. The fascinating aspect of this
issue is that BUMED does not desire to assume full responsi-
bility for alcohol rehabilitation. They do not have the
manpower or facilities to take on the whole task.
The arguments presented to keep the ARC ' s and ARS '
s
separated were many, but the most important issue as far as
the Alcohol Program leaders were concerned, was management.
As addressed in earlier chapters, both the operational side
and medical side had their hand into treatment. Both NMPC
and BUMED felt it should remain this way for a number of
reasons. The primary thought was that if BUMED took control
over the entire process the "Line," or operational Navy,
would then feel little identification with the problem and
would lose it's sensitivity to alcohol abuse. It was felt
support for identification and referral for treatment of the
alcoholic would collapse. If, on the other hand, it were
given entirely to the "Line," the Medical Department would
also feel little responsibility to support the program.
BUMED felt that even as an identified disease, alcohol
abuse and alcoholism could be normally treated effectively
outside the hospital environment. As addressed in Chapter
IV, the ARC's and ARS ' s used a multidisciplinary blend of
medical treatment, group therapy, education, spiritual rein-
forcement and individual counseling. The medical treatment
was primarily oriented toward detoxification, the withdrawal
of the addict from alcohol. This had to be handled at the
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hospital level due to the critical nature of the detoxifi-
cation procedure. But other minor problems could be handled
quite adequately at ARC ' s . One of the real reasons for re-
quired medical involvement was referrals for treatment.
Numerous alcoholics had been identified through emergency
room treatment of automobile accident cases, spouse or child
abuse, chronic illness, etc. It was necessary to gain the
support of the Medical Department to ensure continued refer-
rals. Often the stigma attached to alcoholism was perceived
by the doctors as being worse than the injury requiring
medical care. Without continued involvement by the medical
staff, it was possible for many alcohol abusers to continue
their problem drinking due to a "sympathetic" doctor.
NADAP had other reasons for dual involvement. They quite
frankly felt that the medical doctors were generally very
poor managers and that the program would not organizationally
survive if run by the medical department. The NADAP personnel
also felt that BUMED was never very supportive of the Program
in general and came into the picture because of the dollars
and CNO insistence. Finally, NADAP felt that the Alcohol
Program reached maturation because of the understanding of
recovered alcoholics who made up a large part of the Program
organization, that their motivation and zeal carried the
idea of a viable rehabilitation program into reality.
The arguments for and against the integration of ARC '
s
and ARS ' s are many and will have to be resolved soon. There
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is continuing pressure to smooth out the rough, fragmented
organization of the treatment programs. It is speculated
that this pressure will build until the CNO makes a declara-
tion on the makeup of the Alcohol Program for the future.
The worry with the NMPC-63 staff is the loss of influence.
It has lost the ability to guide much of it's own destiny
as had been possible in the past. There are new programs
including Family Advocacy, Weight Control, and Physical Fit-
ness that are requiring additional attention. These are
the responsibility of NMPC-6 3 under NMPC-6 and they will have
to utilize scarce NADAP resources to answer the call for action
The future appears to be a bit confused.
C. CONCLUSIONS
This was a period of bureaucratization for the Alcohol
Program. While it had been assimilated into the Navy struc-
ture between 1974 to 1977, it had not yet conformed to the
standard operating procedures of the parent organization.
The characteristics of a bureaucracy, as defined by
William Haga [20] , had been fulfilled in the last three
years
:
1. The Program was specialized for efficiency. Virtually
all counselors were trained at schools co-located with
the ARC's. It was geared to understanding the alco-
holic and directed to the best way to treat him/her,
as the Alcohol Program perceived the problem.
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2. There existed a hierarchy for control. In fact, a
new line of responsibilities, while somewhat disjointed,
was recently established for tight regulation. It was
getting more and more difficult for the Alcohol Pro-
gram to penetrate the layers of command above them to
initiate new programs or expand established ones.
3. By establishing new responsibilities and management
policy, it blocked the formally aggressive directors
from effectively influencing the hierarchy. In other
words, the job was more important than the personality
of the individual in the position.
4. The leaders now had limited power. They could not cir-
cumvent the chain of command but had to work within the
newly limited scope of the job.
5. Careers were possible within NADAP . The enlisted Navy
Alcohol Counselors had codes to identify their specialty,
It was declared that officers could serve in the Program
without stigma, although there is little evidence to
support this claim by the Navy. Promotions prove the
opposite. However, with the expanded responsibilities
of NMPC-63, it was possible to work in other related
areas and return to the Alcohol Abuse Program.
6. It was a full time responsibility, without a doubt.
The leaders would have preferred even more personnel
and time devoted to the Alcohol Program.
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7. The authority of the Director was based on the position,
not the charisma of the person in the job.
Obviously, this did not happen overnight. It is specu-
lated the Navy had been attempting to bureaucratize this
Program since 1976 when virtually all the treatment and
education facilities had been established. The Navy felt it
time to get control.
The treatment worked. The Alcohol Program was success-
fully returning alcoholic service members back to their com-
mands as productive workers. But the Navy perceived that
their needs had been fulfilled, a successful program was in
operation, therefore innovation was no longer necessary. The
Program continued to be fed money, but certainly no radical
departures were tolerated as had been in the past. The
personnel were still by and large recovered alcoholics but
in a "station keeping" status. New fights for additional
centers, services, or counseling centers, were lost before
they really got off the ground.
So the Navy had accepted the new Program. The original
shock waves of the early 70 's had settled down. It was an
established support system in competition for dollars and
manpower on an equal status with other established support
programs
.
This is not to say the Alcohol Program is ineffective.
Despite the gearing down, the treatment and education facili-
ties are still working at capacity on roughly the same success
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rate for the last 4 years. It remains cost effective, and





As stated in Chapter II, early support (1965-1970) by
both the public and private sector for Alcohol Rehabilita-
tion Programs was virtually non-existent. For the Navy, it
was two individuals who formulated a "bootlegged" program.
Although the Alcohol Rehabilitation Program took shape at
Long Beach, neither of these two designers of the treatment
program had the power or influence to convince the Navy that
the program had a future. Indeed, they had trouble convincing
their own Command, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)
that this program was a viable solution to alcoholism.
The then current personnel needs of the Navy as a whole
were convincingly met without having to allow the development
of an additional sub-unit. This was largely due to the exist-
ence of conscription. Mission accomplishment was apparently
not hampered by the claimed high costs associated with toler-
ation of alcoholics in the working environment. Conscription
was keeping most of the manpower coffers full, although
re-enlistment rates were falling sharply.
The situation for the Navy until 1970 was to tolerate
this idiosyncratic experiment of alcohol rehabilitation at
Long Beach. It is speculated that the perception was that
the cost was minimal in both facilities and manpower, and
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therefore allowed to happen. In fact, one of the originators
operating the unit worked as a non-reimbursed volunteer for
four years at the Long Beach facility. The two individuals
did continue to perfect the treatment process by trial and
error, utilizing the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) model as the
basis for development. It was not clear what the intentions
were of this early development. It was assumed that "saving
lives" was the bottom line, as it was in AA. Obviously, no
long term strategy could be developed at this time, for sur-
vival of this small experiment was a day-to-day fight. There
were no forces strong enough to allow any significant growth
of this sub-unit. The Navy had no reason to listen.
As 1970 approached, the three major forces addressed in
Chapter III were formulating. All three of these forces had
the potential to be major disruptions to the status quo of
the Naval organization. The Vietnam War was having major
impacts already. The selection of a liberal Chief of Naval
Operations would surely result in some changes, the question
was how much. And the passage of Public Laws 91-616 and
92-129, while not earth shattering, certainly added fuel to
the fire for recognition of alcohol abuse as a problem that
must be dealt with by the Navy. Undoubtedly, there were
other justified programs vying for attention at this time.
The reason that this was one of the programs that got fund-
ing and personnel to establish itself, was due to the inno-
vative personnel who took charge of the development.
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These innovators had no major issues to quickly align
with as did other programs. For example, race relations had
the power of civil disruptions and finally riots aboard Navy
ships; the drug program had highly visible documentation of
massive addiction of troops in Vietnam. There was no major
publicity that the Alcohol Program could use as leverage,
just an accumulation of many smaller issues.
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to review
the reasons for the major social changes taking place in our
society during this time. But it is important to note that
the appointed leaders of the Alcohol Program used this envi-
ronment of social change to make major advances in the devel-
opment of alcohol rehabilitation treatment. Given the go
ahead by the Chief of Naval Operations, they set out to
construct a package for recovery of the alcoholic in the
Navy. The reason that the program was even given a chance
was the intersecting of these major forces addressed in
Chapter III.
The recovered alcoholic leaders of this program were
truly zealots for alcohol rehabilitation. It was something
few would understand who have not been laying drunk "at the
bottom of the cliff." Numerous books have been written on
the psychological makeup of the typical alcoholic and effec-
tive treatment. Suffice it to say that there appears to be
no "typical anything" in alcohol rehabilitation. It is unique
in personalities and treatment. But as previously stated,
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most of the personnel in the beginning of the development
of the Alcohol Program reached their current recovery level
through Alcoholics Anonymous. This was a group of alcoholics
devoted to helping alcoholics. Their philosophy included
the belief that they were never permanently "cured." It
was life away from the bottle on a day-to-day basis. There
were no guarantees that reversion to past habits of excessive
alcohol consumption was not possible. While appearing short-
sighted, it apparently was the most effective method of
treatment found by these personnel.
There were advantages to this Program developed by AA
personnel. They had true understanding of the patients they
were attempting to place in rehabilitation. With this insight,
it would be possible to establish the credibility with the
parent organization of what a rehabilitation program can and
can not do for the patient.
Indeed, to fashion an Alcohol Rehabilitation Program that
would be effective, these first leaders and workers were
needed. It would not have been possible to make any rapid
advancements without their total devotion to the creation of
the Program. A glance at the failures of the Army and Air
Force to get their program running without the recovered
alcoholics' direction is positive testimony to the proper
avenue that the Navy took.
While much of middle management and some upper manage-
ment were not the least bit anxious about alcohol abuse,
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the CNC was deeply concerned. This markedly changed the
supporting structure for the Program, if not the attitude
toward it. Readjusting this negative attitude toward alcohol
rehabilitation was to be an uphill battle that still is not
completely resolved. It certainly was not ignored by the
Program leaders. Captain Jim Baxter, the first Alcohol
Program Director, spent literally weeks on the road talking
to anyone who would listen about what the Alcohol Program
was to accomplish. As stated by an early alcohol program
leader,
"We were not a temperance organization; we were not chang-
ing to that... we were changing the view of what an alco-
holic and alcoholism was."
One of the conclusions of this study is that these
recovered alcoholics were not performing strictly for the
Navy or to serve the Navy's goal, rather they were oriented
to Alcoholics Anonymous twelfth step (Appendix A) . In ser-
vicing their own needs through the Navy, they were highly
motivated and would go to extraordinary lengths to ensure
proper programs were initiated. This "crusader" atmosphere
resulted in these innovative personnel establishing far
reaching treatment, but directed exclusively to alcohol abuse,
Because there was little identification by the recovered
alcoholic with illicit drug abuse, affiliation with this
sister program was avoided. The only apparent connection
was through utilization of the Drug Abuse Program assets.
85

The Alcohol Program leaders did easily identify, and
were deeply concerned, with the "closet alcoholic." A
"closet alcoholic" would not normally seek help, but might
accept it if confronted with their drinking problem. It was
important for the Program to identify and bring out these
hidden and often protected abusers. Once identified, treat-
ment could be ordered, for acceptance of treatment by the
alcoholic was not one of the criteria for referral. It came
to pass that an identified alcoholic could be sent for reha-
bilitation against his/her will. This was to overcome the
often vehement denial by the alcoholic of recognition of
their obvious abuse problem. This referral policy was cer-
tainly quite an achievement for the Program leaders.
These innovative early Alcohol Program leaders could have
confronted much resistance while selling their Program. They
were a minority, but venturesome and eager to try new ideas.
This, coupled with the burning desire to help others that
had their same problem, would have made it difficult if not
impossible to dampen their enthusiasm when given the resources
to make it all possible. The innovations presented by these
leaders certainly could have been rejected by the system if
the system felt the change unnecessary or unwarranted. The
Navy collectively turned down very little that the innovators
presented in the turbulent years of development from 1971 to
1974. The reason for this was the proper handling of the
introduction of this new rehabilitation program by it's
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leaders. The Alcohol Program was in a project status which
gave them the blessings of the CNO to cross lines of authority
throughout the Navy to resolve any differences. Project
status also guaranteed "fenced" funds and billets. Captain
Baxter and his office were well prepared with development
plans, success statistics, and unbounded enthusiasm. The
Program was sold to other Commanders as being cost effective
for the Navy as a whole, and a vehicle for the Commanders
to derive assistance for the little understood problem of
alcoholism. The personnel shortage was not severe yet, the
Commanders could generally afford to give up a member of
their command for the possibility of gaining a better performer
in 6 weeks. The commands had to do little for this benefit.
It was cost free to them, and required no additional admini-
strative burden. Truly one of the few no-cost, no-obligation,
opportunities for the Commanders left in the Navy.
Although beneath the umbrella of the Human Goals Program,
the Alcohol Program did not visibly align itself with it.
They felt the Human Goals Program did not enjoy a positive
reputation among the Line Commanders. So while this organi-
zational structure was not overtly denied by anyone in the
Alcohol Program, they did not offer a diagram of their chain
of command to briefed commands if it could have been avoided.
The Alcohol Program also went to great lengths to ensure
the traditional values of the Navy were not dislodged. All
ARC's were run as military organizations with personnel
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inspections and most of the other "amenities" of a typical
military command. There were problems in the beginning with
liberalization while undergoing treatment, but it was dis-
covered that maintaining military discipline at the Centers
did a great deal to maintain the credibility of the Program.
The resources to carry this Program through came from a
variety of sources. The leaders were just as creative in
this endeavor. They had a non-alcoholic supporter with
Rear Admiral Rauch. Captain Baxter and friends would present
convincing arguments covering expansion of alcohol rehabilita-
tion and Rauch had the capability to produce the funds. This
teamwork resulted in a great expansion of the Program in a
relatively short time. It was during these years that the
Program was formalized, but total integration by the Navy
was not to come about for a few more years.
By 1975, the Alcohol Program had made its point; it was
a cost effective vehicle for the Navy to salvage its alco-
holics. Virtually all the rehabilitation treatment centers
and units were in place and NASAP was proving its worth.
The Program leaders were still creating most instructions
and notices concerning alcohol abuse policy and procedures.
They had been completely divorced from the Drug Program and
continued to press for prevention of alcohol abuse.
In the hustle and bustle of the struggle for recognition,
the Program became what appeared to be a structural nightmare.
Specifically, there were numerous commands involved in the
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process of treatment of the alcoholic. However, the "many
hands in the pie" game was strongly supported by the designers
of the Alcohol Program. For example, it was felt that the
BUPERS/BUMED split was very important to the survival of
the Program as an effective treatment plan. This was pri-
marily due to the referral problem as addressed in an earlier
chapter, where identification of alcohol abusers could come
through recognition of certain injuries in the hospital
emergency rooms
.
In addition, other commands had an input to the identifi-
cation, referral and treatment of abusers. As the Program
stood in 1976, and still does today, the ARC ' s were under
BUPERS (now called NMPC) , the ARS ' s were under BUMED, and
the CAAC ' s were under Commander-in-Chiefs of the respective
fleets (CINC's). In addition, some NASAP ' s were controlled
through NMPC and others locally. Certainly this presented
problems, like career planning, effective cross talk among
facilities, and perpetual tension between all the commands
involved. But the Program felt this total involvement was
absolutely necessary for recognition, cooperation, and
referrals. As long as they all had to accept the responsi-
bility for identifying and helping the abuser, the abuser
would in fact receive assistance. So despite the fractured
approach, it seemed to have worked. It resulted in broaching
alcoholism at all levels of these commands and very broad
coverage in the "Fleet" for identification of alcohol abuse.
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As stated in the Conclusions in Chapter V, the aggressive
leaders of the Program felt they had little to lose by taking
such an unorthodox approach. The potential benefits far
outweighed the possible negative impact on their career if
it failed. Personnel careers mattered little, their assump-
tion being that selection for a higher rank was encumbered
with the recognition that they were once alcoholics. Evi-
dence seems to support that perception. This author could
not find, in all these interviews, an example of how one
leader in alcohol rehabilitation was rewarded by promotion
to a higher grade in all of the 1970 's. Instead, they created
what one might term a second career within the Navy, by using
the organization to further their belief that alcoholics can
be saved from their disease.
On the other hand, the Navy was allowing Alcohol Program
growth based on decisions made by this sub-unit. The Alcohol
Program, of course, created its own criteria on what was
adequate growth. Whether this was realized by the Navy at
this time is unknown, but by 1978, senior Navy officers tried
to gain control again. The Alcohol and Drug program was
forced to merge, as were the CAAC ' s and ARD's. This stream-
lining reduced the overall influence of the Alcohol Program.
This effect was not immediate. At first the leaders used
the combined Program as a basis for reallocation of more
effort to the Alcohol Program. But pressures for recognition
of the drug problem and eventual addition of other programs
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like Weight Control and Physical Fitness to the shop where
they worked, forced a de-emphasis. The Directors were still
recovered alcoholics, but tolerance by the Navy for their
innovative character had worn thin.
The Program could not hold back the surging tide of
bureaucratization. The price the Alcohol Program had to pay
for recognition by the Navy was full assimilation into the




The Navy perceived this Program as a rider to other social
action programs under Admiral Zumwalt's Human Goals plans.
But as the Alcohol Program developed, it proved it's cost
effectiveness in treatment of active duty personnel. In a
different time, even this may not have been enough to ensure
survival; however, with the predicted reduction in manpower
in the winds, this was another story. The Alcohol Rehabili-
tation Programs were designed to return well trained active
duty members to productive work. Given the Alcohol Program
generated statistics, it could prove that it could provide
more productive manpower at a reduced cost. The Alcohol
Program leaders approached the whole issue with what the
treatment could do for the Navy, and the Navy proved to be
a willing customer.
It is strongly felt this Program growth, as illustrated
here, would not have happened as rapidly without the recovered
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alcoholics' participation. The system had rarely encountered
such dedication to development of a program. Constant stimu-
lus was offered externally by AA to these recovered alcohol-
ics, throughout this Program development. In addition, these
mavericks were permitted to freely travel across command lines
of authority much like a developing child was tolerated by
a parent. However, before long it was expected to fall in
line with current values and procedures. The tolerance for
digression from expected normal behavior in the system was
decidedly lower after maturation of the project. It was
allowed to develop and it developed into one of the most
favorably recognized rehabilitation programs in the nation.
But the Navy has now said, "enough is enough, it is time to
get control."
Just as these innovators were necessary for the growth
of the Program, they could quite possibly do it irreparable
harm if they addressed today's problems as they did 10 years
ago. Gone is the protection of top level support, the tol-
erance for the behavior of the early Program leaders, the
freely accessible budget, the power of single layer manage-
ment, and external forces to keep the Program visible. With-
out these supports, innovation can not flourish.
The advantages of innovation, flexibility, creativity
and high motivation, are now perceived by the Navy as far
too heavy a price to pay for the potential benefits. For
the Navy to allow innovation, it is permitting a certain loss
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of control. And as expected, the Navy desired tight control
of all its branches, including NADAP
.
As Charles Perrow points out, it would take enormous
resources for the Navy to treat each case, or sub-unit as
unique [21] . The tendency of a large organization like the
Navy, was to pigeonhole the process. In this case, allowing
the sub-unit to function, but in accordance with the parent
organization's needs and procedures. This included formali-
zation of the sub-unit.
However, the early leaders did tailor their Program to
a certain extent to the Navy's goals, as an insurance policy
for successful institutionalization of alcohol rehabilitation
into the organization.
It should not be forgotten that this was done by the
Program leaders to service their own perceived needs. But
in the end it became a bureaucratized structure like the one
for which they were working. As a result of the full bureau-
cratization, the current leaders are not faced with many of
the choices that their predecessors had. Any desired devia-
tion by the Alcohol Program from the norm, from that already
institutionalized, will take a massive effort.
This is not to say the Program isn't doing the work for
which it was established. The early developers did a magnif-
icent job of structuring Centers and Services for rehabilitation,
and initiation of NASAP, the prevention program. As addressed
earlier, there are problems to be resolved; however, it is
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this author's conviction that just as the Alcohol Program





TWELVE STEPS TO SOBRIETY
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol - that our
lives had become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves
could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to
the care of God, as we understood Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human
being the exact nature of our wrongs.
6. We're entirely ready to have God remove all these defects
of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became
willing to make amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible,
except when to do so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were
wrong promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our
conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only




12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these
steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to






Following an extensive nationwide examination of existing programs beginning
with the federally-funded ASAP efforts, NASAP developed and accepted several
basic hypotheses which, when validated, became tenets of the approach to the
problem Prevention is one of those tenets.
The purpose of prevention is to increase the individual's understanding of per-
sonally and professionally distinctive alcohol-related behavior. The NASAP program
is aimed at reducing the number of persons whose potentially existing alcohol-
related behavior adversely affects the way they carry out everyday living.
Prevention activities take place at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary.
1
.
Primary prevention includes all activities that reduce the number of new cases
with initial alcohol-related disabilities. It is based on an individual's formation of
values, attitudes and beliefs and occurs principally in the formal education of K-1 2
or in the home — generally areas out of direct control of the Navy
2. Secondary prevention efforts are directed to people who have non-addictive
drinkmg-related behaviors such as often result from inappropriate use or occasional
overuse of alcohol This requires facilitating the change of existing values and at-
titudes of the individual — a NASAP process which can occur at any time.
3. Tentiary prevention refers to activities concerned with people who have severe
alcohol-related behaviors. These persons are diagnosed as alcoholics Therefore,
screening and evaluation at the outset become key elements of the program. In-
dividuals who show a need for more extensive care for referred for clinical diagnosis
and treatment.
HOW IS SECONDARY PREVENTION ACCOMPLISHED?
NASAP, as the Navy's secondary prevention effort, is designed to identify and
reduce the problems caused by alcohol misuse and/or alcoholism. NASAP's efforts
focus on addressing problems at the earliest possible stage, when they are first
identified through civilian law violations, work-related accidents, military offenses,
and hospital emergency room or sick call records.
NASAP, however, as an educational program that deals with basic attitudes which
affect the whole person is, in its application in no way restricted to those experienc-
ing alcohol-related difficulties Its use has been of equal value in the training and
development of human behavior in supervisors, accession point candidates,
medical personnel and others Attitudes regarding alcohol and its use on a personal
basis most often reflect the posture of others with whom an individual might have
contact such as a supervisor, medical care practitioner, family member friend or
simply peer If the attitudes of such persons are based on the many myths or
misconceptions prevalent in society, they will be ill-equipped to help those who
come within their sphere of influence.
IS THE EDUCATIONAL DESIGN UNIQUE?
The bilateral design of NASAP's education course is tailored to utilize the
dynamics of both individual and group development (Figure 3). The curriculum
carefully melds alcohol awareness with individual choice and change The change
model incorporated encourages the development of positiveness. motivation, and
reinforcement for change within the individual This change comes through em-




A FRAMEWORK FOR COURSE
DESIGN*
NAVY ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM
LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2
Knowledge & Information Human Development (Individual & Group)
SESSION I Program Orientation Climate Setting
SESSION II Federal, State & Local Roles Credibility
SESSION III Human Body Physical Ownership
SESSION IV Driving Confidence, Trust & Cohesion
SESSION V Psychological Personal Ownership
SESSION VI Symptoms & Phases Initial Commitment for Change
SESSION VII Attitudes & Actions Personal Change Alternatives
SESSION VIII Attitudes & Leadership Effecting Change in Others
SESSION IX Helping Network Support Systems for Change
SESSION X The Family Personal Support
SESSION XI Supervisor's Role Organizational Support
SESSION XII The Beginning Success — A Winner
*This Bilateral Design is tailored to utilize the dynamics
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